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Abstract 
[Excerpt] This report examines three labor issues and arguments related to the pending U.S.-Colombia 
free trade agreement (CFTA): violence against trade unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment 
of the perpetrators); and worker rights protections for Colombians. For general issues relating to the 
CFTA, see CRS Report RL34470, U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Economic and Political 
Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal. For background on Colombia and its political situation and context 
for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by Colleen W. Cook and 
Clare Ribando Seelke. 
Opponents of the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argue against it on three points: (1) 
the high rate of violence against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the 
perpetrators of that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization 
(ILO) core labor standards and labor laws. 
Proponents of the agreement argue primarily for the proposed Colombia FTA on the basis of economic 
and national security benefits. Accordingly, they argue, the CFTA would: support increased exports, 
expand economic growth, create jobs, and open up investment opportunities for the United States. They 
also argue that it would reinforce the rule of law and spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and anchor 
hemispheric stability. 
Proponents specifically respond to labor complaints of the opponents, that (1) violence against trade 
unionists has declined dramatically since President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002; (2) substantial 
progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has undertaken great efforts to find 
perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian government is taking steps to improve 
conditions for workers. 
If Congress were to approve the Colombia FTA, it would be the second FTA (after Peru) to have some 
labor enforcement “teeth.” Labor provisions including the four basic ILO core labor standards would be 
enforceable through the same dispute settlement procedures as for all other provisions (i.e., primarily 
those for commercial interests.) Opponents argue that under CFTA, only the concepts of core labor 
standards, and not the details of the ILO conventions behind them, would be enforceable. 
Proponents point to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many fronts. They argue that 
approval of the FTA and the economic growth in Colombia that would result is the best way to protect 
Colombia’s trade unionists. They also argue that not passing the agreement would not resolve Colombia’s 
labor issues. 
Opponents argue that delaying approval of the proposed CFTA further would give Colombia more time to 
keep improving protections for its workers. This report will be updated as events warrant. 
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Summary
This report examines three labor issues and arguments related to the
pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA): violence against trade
unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators); and
worker rights protections for Colombians.  For general issues relating to the CFTA,
see CRS Report RL34470, U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Economic and
Political Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.  For background on Colombia and
its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250,
Colombia: Issues for Congress, by Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Opponents of the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argue
against it on three points: (1) the high rate of violence against trade unionists in
Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the perpetrators of that violence;
and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization (ILO) core
labor standards and labor laws.
Proponents of the agreement argue primarily for the proposed Colombia FTA
on the basis of economic and national security benefits.  Accordingly, they argue, the
CFTA would: support increased exports, expand economic growth, create jobs, and
open up investment opportunities for the United States.  They also argue that it would
reinforce the rule of law and spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and anchor
hemispheric stability.
Proponents specifically respond to labor complaints of the opponents, that (1)
violence against trade unionists has declined dramatically since President Álvaro
Uribe took office in 2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity
issue as the government has undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring
them to justice; and (3) the Colombian government is taking steps to improve
conditions for workers.
If Congress were to approve the Colombia FTA, it would be the second FTA
(after Peru) to have some labor enforcement “teeth.”  Labor provisions including the
four basic ILO core labor standards would be enforceable through the same dispute
settlement procedures as for all other provisions  (i.e., primarily those for commercial
interests.) Opponents argue that under CFTA, only the concepts of core labor
standards, and not the details of the ILO conventions behind them, would be
enforceable.
Proponents point to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many
fronts. They argue that approval of the FTA and the economic growth in Colombia
that would result is the best way to protect Colombia’s trade unionists. They also
argue that not passing the agreement would not resolve Colombia’s labor issues.
Opponents argue that delaying approval of the proposed CFTA further would
give Colombia more time to keep improving protections for its workers. This report
will be updated as events warrant.
 Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Trade/Economic Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Labor Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Violence Against Trade Unionists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Long-Term Trends in Murders of Trade Unionists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Long-Term Trends in Three Measures of Violence Against 
Trade Unionists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Impunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Labor Laws, Protections, and Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Possible Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
List of Figures
Figure 1.  Historic Data on Murders of Trade Unionists,
 1997-2008 (Projected) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 2.  Assassinations, Death Threats and Arbitrary Detentions of 
Trade Unionists, 1999-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
 
1
  The proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed on November 22,
2006. Implementing legislation was introduced on April 8, 2008 as H.R. 5724 and S. 2830.
On April 9, 2008, through H.Res. 1092 (Report 110-575) the House made certain provisions
under “trade promotion authority” (otherwise known as the “fast-track”) inapplicable to the
CFTA, so that it is no longer obligated to vote within 60 days of a session and may schedule
a vote at any time. This stopped the fast-track clock. For more information on the fast-track
or trade promotion process, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA):
Issues, Options, and Prospects for Renewal, by J. F. Hornbeck and William H. Cooper; and
CRS Report RL33864, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Renewal: Core Labor Standards
Issues, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Proposed Colombia Free Trade Agreement: 
Labor Issues
The purpose of this report is to examine three labor issues and arguments related
to the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA): violence against trade
unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators); and
worker rights protections for Colombians.1  For general issues relating to the CFTA,
see CRS Report RL34470, U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Economic and
Political Implications, by M. Angeles Villarreal.  For background on Colombia and
its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250,
Colombia: Issues for Congress, by Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Opponents of the pending U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argue
against it on three points: (1) the high rate of violence (murders, arbitrary
detentions/kidnappings, and death threats) against trade unionists in Colombia; (2)
the lack of adequate punishment for the perpetrators of that violence; and (3) weak
Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor
standards and labor laws.
Proponents of the agreement argue primarily for the proposed Colombia FTA
on the basis of economic and national security benefits. Trade typically benefits all
parties to a trade agreement, as each country tends to specialize in exporting those
goods which it can produce relatively more efficiently, and to import those which it
produces relatively less efficiently. Accordingly, proponents argue, the CFTA would:
support increased exports, expand economic growth, create jobs, offer consumers a
greater variety of goods and services at lower prices, and encourage economic
development by attracting foreign investment and expanding output. They also argue
that it would reinforce the rule of law, spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and
anchor hemispheric stability.
Proponents specifically respond to the above labor complaints that (1) murders
and kidnappings against trade unionists have declined  dramatically since President
Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the
CRS-2
2
 This section was taken from CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by
Colleen W. Cook and Clare Ribando Seelke.
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 U.S. International Trade Commission.  U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement:
Potential Economy-Wide and Selected Sectoral Effects, December, 2006. P. 2-13.
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 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Colombia FTA Facts, October 2008.
impunity issue as the government has undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators
and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian government is taking steps to
improve conditions for workers.
Background
Political Context2
Colombia is one of the oldest democracies in Latin America, and has a
bicameral legislature.  Yet it has been plagued by an ongoing armed conflict for over
40 years. This violence has its roots in a lack of state control over much of
Colombian territory– rugged terrain that has been hard to govern.  In addition, a long
history of poverty and inequality has left Colombia open to other influences, among
them drug trafficking.  Leftist guerrilla groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution
formed in the 1960s as a response to state neglect and poverty. Right-wing
paramilitaries formed in the 1980s to defend landowners, many of them drug
traffickers, against guerrillas. The shift of coca production from Peru and Bolivia to
Colombia in the 1980s increased drug violence  and provided a new source of
revenue for both guerrillas and paramilitaries. In 2002 Colombians elected an
independent, Álvaro Uribe, as President, largely because of his aggressive plan to
reduce violence in Colombia.
Trade/Economic Context 
Colombia is the United States’ fourth largest trading partner in Latin America,
and its 33rd largest import source and 26th largest export destination world-wide.
Machinery, organic chemicals, and cereals constitute half of total exports to
Colombia, and petroleum accounts for 41% of all imports from Colombia. Given the
relatively small level of trade between the United States and Colombia, the CFTA
would, according to a U.S. International Trade Commission report, likely have
minimal to no effect on output or employment for most sectors of the U.S. economy.3
U.S. proponents argue that the proposed CFTA would provide a number of
economic benefits, including market access for U.S. consumer and industrial
products; cooperation in the production of textiles and apparel; and new opportunities
for U.S. farmers and ranchers.4 However, the trade effect overall is expected to be
very small. The largest changes in U.S. output are projected for the cereal grains
production sector (0.3%) and the sugar sector (-0.3%); the largest changes in U.S.
employment are projected to be in cereal grains (0.3%), sugar cane (-0.3%), and
CRS-3
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 Colombian embassy, in an interview, November 20, 2008.
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October 2008, p. 16; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; and U.S. State Department. Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2007, published March 2008.
textiles (-0.3%.)5  Colombia’s exports to the United States already enter the United
States mostly duty-free under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).  However,
new U.S. investment in Colombia as a result of the agreement could support
increased economic growth and employment and additional exports to the United
States.
Colombian proponents argue that the only Western Hemisphere “Pacific Rim”
countries with which the United States does not have a free trade agreement are
Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama. The United States has FTAs with all others:
Canada, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Peru,
and Chile.  The investment that goes into these other countries from the United States
as a result, the Colombian Embassy argues, means that new exports from Latin
America to the United States are increasingly coming from non-Colombian countries,
putting Colombia at an economic disadvantage relative to its neighbors.6  
Labor Context 
Colombia’s official labor force is about 18.2 million, as compared with 138
million for the United States. Roughly 23% of Colombia’s labor force is involved in
the agricultural sector, 19% is involved in the manufacturing/industry sector, and
58% is employed in the service sector.  Almost 60% of the workforce in Colombia
is employed in the (largely unregulated, undocumented) informal sector. The
unemployment rate in Colombia is roughly 11.8% in 2008.  During most of  the more
than 40 years that Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict, membership
and participation in labor unions has waned. Between 1959 and 1965, the
unionization rate grew from 5.5% to 13.5%.  Since 1966, the unionization rate has
declined to 4% or 742,000 of the 18.2 million workforce.  Of these, fewer than
150,000, or 0.8% of the labor force are working under a labor contract.7  
Violence Against Trade Unionists
Long-Term Trends in Murders of Trade Unionists
A key issue in the debate on the CFTA is the long-term trend in murders of
Colombia’s trade unionists as they try to express rights that are in concept protected
in Colombia’s laws.
Three organizations track data on the number of trade unionists murdered each
year: the Colombian government; the International Trade Union Confederation
(ITUC), successor to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU);
CRS-4
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 Until recently, murders of teachers were not counted in Colombian government statistics.
Yet teachers constitute the group that has suffered the most casualties. Out of 1,994 murders
in which the victim is identified by occupation between 1986 and 2006, 825 or 41% have
been teachers.  Source: 2,515 or that sinister case to forget, by Guillermo Correa Montoya,
researcher for the ENS. Two researchers note that most teachers who are victims are
typically singled out for what they do outside of their classrooms as labor activists. Source:
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June 17, 2003.
and the Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS) or National Labor School, a non-
governmental organization founded in 1982 in Colombia to provide “non-partisan
and independent” information on  human rights, labor, and the dynamics of
association and collective bargaining.  Figure 1 below tracks each of their data on
the number of murders of trade unionists in Colombia and world-wide between 1997
and 2008 (projected). It shows a wide year-to-year variation in the number of trade
unionists murdered, but a distinct downward trend since 2001. 
Inconsistency among the three trend lines for Colombia reflects the fact that the
three data sources do not always agree on which murders should be counted as “trade
unionist.” Those murders that may not be counted by all sources include non-
affiliated advisors to unions, retired and inactive union members, rural and
community organization members, and teachers.8  The large bump in the murder
trend line from 1999-2003 coincides with a large bulge in the cultivation of coca
produced in Colombia and a simultaneous decline in coca production in Bolivia and
Peru, according to Department of State data.  The fact that the three lines for
Colombia’s murders of trade unionists  closely track and crowd the line depicting
such murders world-wide shows the extent to which Colombia accounts for most
such world-wide murders. Colombia’s share ranges from a low of 49% in 1999 to a
high of 86% in 2002, and then declines to 54% in 2006.
Proponents argue that other countries may not document the murders of their
trade unionists as carefully as Colombia does.
CRS-5
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Source: ICFTU/ITUC, ENS, and Colombian Government
Opponents of the proposed Colombia FTA tend to focus on the entire 10 year
trend in murders and the close relationship between Colombia’s murders and world-
wide murders of trade unionists.  Proponents, including the Bush Administration and
the Colombian government, focus on the steady decline in such murders since Uribe
became president in 2002, and on actions taken recently by the Colombian
government to reduce these fatalities. Such actions include bringing to Colombia a
permanent ILO representative, passing new labor laws,  stepping up enforcement of
labor laws, implementing a new judicial system, and setting up a trade unionist
protection program. Under this program, as of March 7, 2008, roughly 1,983 trade
unionists were receiving protection –  21% of all persons receiving protection, but
30% of the total protection budget of $13.1 million.9  Opponents of the Colombia
FTA also point out other reasons for the decline in murders, including the decline in
targets:  Unions in Colombia have dwindled from 13% of the formal labor force in
1965 to 4% currently. They and their efforts have been eroded primarily through such
means as violence and employer-mandated union-substitution devices such as
government-sanctioned collective pacts and recently outlawed cooperative
associations.10
Proponents of the proposed CFTA point out that the number of trade unionists
murdered as a share of all trade unionists is considerably smaller than the total
Figure 1.  Historic Data on Murders of Trade Unionists, 1997-2008
(Projected)
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 Speech by Luciano Vasquez, Director General of the ENS, sponsored by the Global Policy
Network, February 27, 2008. 
number of murders as a share of the general population. The AFL- CIO counters that
“It is simply not meaningful to compare random crime statistics to targeted
assassinations.”11
Long-Term Trends in Three Measures of Violence Against
Trade Unionists
A companion issue to trade unionist murders is long-term trends in three
separate measures of trade union violence: murders/assassinations,
kidnappings/arbitrary detentions, and death threats.
Proponents of the CFTA note reductions in assassinations and arbitrary
detentions since 2004.  Opponents, examining the data longer term, focus on a third
means of intimidation: death threats.  They argue that in recent years perpetrators
have switched their focus from murders to death threats, because this more subtle
form of intimidation can achieve the same results of discouraging union activity with
less public notice.12  These three methods of intimidation are tracked individually in
the left graph in Figure 2 and cumulatively in the right graph. The right graph shows
that assassinations were about equal to death threats in 2001-2002 when murders
were at their peak, but averaged less than one-quarter the number of death threats
between 2003 and 2007, when murders were lower.
Source: Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS, 2008)
Impunity
The second main issue of opponents in debating CFTA is impunity –
accountability for and punishment by the perpetrators of assassinations, arbitrary
detentions, and death threats.
Figure 2.  Assassinations, Death Threats and Arbitrary Detentions of
Trade Unionists, 1999-2007
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Perpetrators of the violence typically fall into three main groups: paramilitaries,
guerrillas, and the Colombian military.13  The human rights advocates group Amnesty
International USA reports on the difficulty in identifying the perpetrators in cases of
trade union violence. However, it reports that, among “cases in which clear evidence
of responsibility is available” in 2005, of all human rights abuses against trade
unionists: paramilitaries committed 49%; security forces committed 43%; guerrilla
forces committed 2%; and criminals committed 4%.14
Proponents of the agreement cite data showing progress in bringing perpetrators
of the violence to justice: As the result of a tripartite agreement with the ILO (among
the government, trade confederations, and business groups), the Office of the
Colombian Prosecutor General, in October 2006, created a special sub-unit to
investigate and prosecute 1,262 criminal cases of violence against trade union
members. These included 187 priority cases as determined by the unions. As of April
2008, there have been a total of 105 convictions of violence against trade union
members between 2001 and 2008, with 55 of them handed down in 2007-2008.15
Luciano Vasquez, Director General of the ENS views convictions over a longer
period of time and points out that since 1986, in about 97% of the cases of murders
of trade unionists, the perpetrators have never been identified and brought to justice.
He argues further that while in some cases the perpetrators of labor killings are found
guilty, in zero cases has the mastermind behind the crime been convicted.16
Labor Laws, Protections, and Enforcement
A third main issue in the CFTA is adequacy of enforcement of Colombia’s labor
laws, and Colombia’s ability to protect workers.
Proponents point to Colombia’s system of labor laws and protections, which
include ratification of all four ILO core labor standards, which have mostly (but not
totally) been incorporated into Colombian law.  These standards (1) protect the right
of workers to organize and bargain collectively, (2) prohibit forced labor, (3) prohibit
child labor, and (4) provide for non-discrimination in employment.
After long-standing criticisms by the ILO that Colombia was not adhering to its
labor code, in January 2007, a “permanent” ILO representative opened an office in
Colombia pursuant to a June 2006 tripartite agreement.  In October, 2007, it received
$4.0 million in funding from the Colombian government. Subsequently, the ILO
removed Colombia from discussion in its Committee for the Application of
Standards (which examines significant problems in specific countries) for the first
CRS-8
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time in 21 years.17 The ILO has no enforcement authority.  Its main tools are technical
assistance and moral suasion.  However, the government and the ILO are working to
improve cooperation among national, regional and municipal governments to
eradicate child labor and protect working youth – issues addressed in the paragraph
below.
Opponents point to the fact that enforcement of labor laws and standards is an
issue for Colombia as well as throughout Latin America and other developing
countries.  They quote the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, 2007 on the following issues: The right to organize and bargain
collectively in Colombia is limited because of a large informal economic sector,
traditional anti-union attitudes, and violence against trade union leaders.  Forced
labor is a problem in prostitution and in new illegal guerrilla groups which practice
forced conscription, including the conscription of children.  Child labor remains a
significant problem, as well, in the sex industry, in mining, and in coca picking.
Colombia’s 276 labor inspectors for enforcing child labor laws in the formal sector
(covering about 20% of the child labor force) are seen as inadequate for effective
enforcement.
Finally, the State Department’s Country Reports, 2007 also points to the
inadequacy of some of Colombia’s labor laws.  For example, the monthly minimum
wage in Colombia, about $205, does not provide sufficient income to purchase a
basic market basket of goods for a family of four. In addition, it is difficult to enforce
the minimum wage in the informal sector.
Possible Implications
If Congress were to approve the proposed Colombia FTA, it would be the
second FTA (after Peru) to have some labor enforcement “teeth.” Labor provisions
including the four basic ILO core labor standards (enumerated in the previous
section)  would be enforceable through the same dispute settlement procedures as for
all other provisions, such a those for commercial interests. Opponents argue that
under CFTA, only the concepts of core labor standards, and not the details of the ILO
conventions behind them, would be enforceable.
Proponents point to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many
fronts. First the personal protection program for union members has been a success
in that since 2002, not a single trade union member enrolled in the program has been
killed, according to the Colombian Embassy. Second, funding for investigating and
prosecuting perpetrators of crimes against trade unionists has increased. Third the
government has engaged in greater social dialogue with the ILO and other
international union organizations, which are having an impact on national labor
CRS-9
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policy. Fourth, there are a number of new legislative proposals pending to further
protect basic core labor rights.18
On national security issues, proponents acknowledge the continuing violence
in Colombia as well as recent corruption and wiretapping scandals. They assert that
the level of reported violence has steadily and significantly declined under President
Uribe.  They argue further that rather than hiding the scandals or minimizing them,
Colombia is taking steps to root them out and cleanse the political system,
recognizing that more must be done, including bringing to justice those who have
committed crimes against unionists.  However, they argue, walking away from the
proposed CFTA or postponing it until conditions are perfect would send an
unambiguous signal to friends and opponents alike that the United States is an
unreliable partner without a vision for cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.  They
argue that this would make Colombia, Panama, Peru and others who are making
political decisions to enhance relations with the United States despite strong domestic
and external political pressure, re-evaluate their relationship with the United States.19
Opponents argue that delaying the vote on the proposed CFTA further would
give Colombia more time to keep improving protections for its workers. They assert
that Colombia is still the most dangerous place in the world to be a trade unionist,
since it still accounts for the majority of murders of trade unionists world-wide. They
also argue that only 55% of those convicted for murders of trade unionists are in
custody, according the Colombian Attorney General’s office; the rest are at large.
They also argue that members of the Uribe government continue to inaccurately
denounce union members as guerrillas.  Finally they argue that passing the CFTA
could very well halt the “meager” progress by the Colombian government on worker
rights protections achieved to date.20
Proponents argue that approval of the proposed FTA and the economic growth
in Colombia that would result is the best way to protect Colombia’s trade unionists.
They also argue that not passing the agreement would not resolve Colombia’s labor
issues.
